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"Action in rem." as used in the admiralty law is not a scien-
tific phrase in the sense used by standard writers on jurisprudence.
Holland calls a right in rem. "a right available against all the
world; or a right of indeterminate incidence." In admiralty, the
respondent is treated as the offending thing; but the action is
really to recover damages against the owner of the thing for an
injury caused either by his own wrong or that of his agents.
Therefore while the form of the action is in rem., analyzed by the
principles of jurisprudence, it is an action in tersonam. Indeed,
Mr. Holland has pointed this out in his work (page 226):
"Certain rights enforceable in courts of admiralty which are doubtless
capable of being represented as remedial rights in rem. may also be treated as
being merely modes of execution by which true remedial rights are made
effective."
This mode of execution is a necessary means of obtaining jus-
tice in ports where the owner or contractor is not present or where
he has no property except the "thing." It is similar to the juris-
diction of common law courts obtained by attachment of an absent
defendant's property. One mode of proceeding is just as truly an
action in rem. as the other. The latter of course differs in giving
a right to collect the balance of the judgment over and above the
value of the property attached within the State where the action
is instituted ; while in admiralty an election is necessary whether
to sue in rem. or inpersonam.
An action in rem. is distinguished by the fact that the vessel
or thing proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the
defendant and is judged and sentenced accordingly.
1  Its seizure
and advertisement of the same is notice to all the world to come
in and defend in behalf of the inanimate object. It has not the
right of a jury trial and if condemned it passes by judicial sale to
1 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 413.
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a purchaser free from all claims. Herein does the admiralty pro-
ceeding differ from attachment of an absent defendant's property.
Upon execution sale, the title of the personal defendant is alone
sold; in admiralty -the thing itself -to vest absolutely in the
vendee of the marshal and to proceed untrammelled again on its
beneficent or injurious career.
Admiralty lawyers have spent much time and learning in
attempting a proper definition of a maritime hen. Sea laws of all
ages have been threshed thoroughly ; but of all definitions, Judge
Curtis' seems to me the best:
"A real and vested interest in the thing, constituting an incumbrance
placed thereon by operation of law, to be executed by judicial process against
the thing to which no party is made a party save by his voluntary intervention
and claim." 2
This sums it up fairly well: an interest, not a mere privilege,
although there are many cases in the books decided on that theory.
It attaches to the thing itself, and to every part and all the pro-
ceeds thereof, not by agreement of the parties, but by law, and
therefore the law must step in to enforce the lien.
A much travelled bag or trunk comes back from an extended
journey with its owner covered with pasters of express companies,
of steamboat lines, of various inns and hotels. Sometimes appar-
ently the artist has found no place.to put his sign but overlapping
another of earlier date. These pasters can be removed with some
effort, but they will wear off with time however. The paster and
the bag are fairly good illustrations of the maritime hen and the
ship. Of course the connection cannot be pushed to any length;
yet, like the pasters, the liens are firmly attached, and sadly often
they become so numerous as to cover each other, and the earlier
cannot be taken care of until the later have been removed.
But if lawyers have been puzzled to define a maritime lien, they
have been equally at a loss when compelled to state its object-
to what the lien can attach. It was simple fifty years ago to say
"a ship or vessel." But to say nothing of the havoc wrought in
admiralty law by the decision of the General Smith, 4 Wheaton
438, and the following cases, by the Supreme Court of the
United States, modern inventions and the exigencies of modem
life have woefully taxed the discriminations of the admiralty law-
yer-and the true representative of that branch of the profession
was never remarkable in his acquisition of novel notions either of
practice or principles. The wonder is not that judges and lawyers
2 The Young Mechanic, 2 Curtis 404, 413.
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have been so contradictory in their rulings, but so consistent on
the whole. Canal-boats and barges were first admitted to the
list of lien-carriers. The D. C. Salisbuiy, Olc. 7'; The General
Cass, i Browne 334; Endner v. Greco, 3 Fed. Rep. 411; Exparte
Easton, 95 U. S. 68. It will be remembered that canal-boats can-
not be libelled for wages; 8 but if they are not engaged in navi-
gating canals, they are not canal-boats. 4
In the Rock Island Bridge (1869) Mr. Justice Field said:
"A maritime lien can only exist upon moveable things which are the sub-
ject of commerce upon the high seas or navigable waters."
He puts the test "moveable things engaged in navigation."
Mr. Justice Bradley practically uses the phrase "navigable struc-
ture" in Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Company, 119 U. S. 625-629.
So a pild driver, a steam dredge, a steam derrick and a floating
elevator have all been rightly declared objects of a maritime lien;
although this class of floating machines uses navigation only col-
laterally in aid of its other functions. 5 In the Eastern District of
New York, a covered scow used as a boat-house, has been held to
be capable of carrying a maritime lien. The statute gave the lien
for wharfage against a "floating structure;" but the decision did-
not turn upon the statute.6  The ruling cannot be sound. A
boat-house, like that under discussion, floats but does not navi-
gate. The New York statute could have nothing to do with'the
case; for, however the State courts might construe the law (see
Pendleton v. Franklin, 7 N. Y. 508), a State statute cannot con-
vert a structure into a maritime lien-carrier by its mere declara-
tion any more than it can make a contract maritime which has by
nature no maritime features.7 Bridges, wharves and dry-docks
are not objects of the lien clearly; but conflicting decisions have
been rendered in reference to the status of rafts. It has been.
held that they are objects of salvage.8
3 U. S. R. S., See. 425r.
4 Smith v. Canal-boat Wil.'..m L. Norman, 49 Fed. Rep. 285.
5 The Alabama, 22 Fed. Rep. 449; The Pioneer, 3o Fed. Rep. 2o6; Kear-
ney v. A Pile Driver, 3 Fed. Rep. 246; Aitcheson v. Endless Chain Bridge, 40
Fed. Rep. 256; Maltby v,. A Steam Derrick, 3 Hughes 477; Coasting Co. v.
The Commodore, 4o Fed. Rep. 258; The Hezekiah Baldwin, 8 Ben. 556.
6 Woodruff v,. One Covered Scow, 3o Fed. Rep. 269.
7 The Pacific, 9 Fed. Rep. i2o; Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129; The
Guiding Star. ig Fed. Rep. 263.
8 A Raft of Spars, i Abb. Ad. 485; 5o,ooo Feet of Lumber, 2 Low. 64;
Muntz v. A Raft, E5 Fed. Rep. 557; A Raft of Cypress Logs, r Flippin 543.
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Mr. Justice Taney decided differently in Tome v. 4 Cribs of
Lumber, Taney Dec. 533 (see Palmer v. Rouse, 3 Hurl & Nor.
505). It is suggested in the opinion of Muntz v. A Raft (supra)
that there may be a distinction between salvage and other liens;
but I cannot see it unless we accept the theory of Story that there
is a salvage lien for goods derelict on land; a discussion of the lat-
ter subject is given below.9 We cannot sustain the.lien upon the
analogy of flotsam; jetsam, etc., or even of a dead whale, for sal-
vage may be predicated of them because they partake of the
nature of the ship to which they once belonged. The following
cases are libels in .personam for conversion: Zrn re Whale, 2 Hagg.
Adm. 438; Ghen. v. Rich, 8 Fed. Rep. i59-z62; Taber v. Jenny,
i Spr. 315; Bartlett v. Budd, i Low. 223; Swift v. Gifford, 2
Low. IO.
A raft is certainly a floating structure used in navigation,
although it may be broken up at the conclusion of the voyage.
It is the simplest form of a navigating machine. That it has no
motive power of its own can, under the decisions, be no objection.
Neither are the decisions in reference to possessory actions con-
trolling because the rule refers only to ships.10 The case of Jones
v. Coal Barges, 3 Wall. Jr. 53, it seems to me, was wrongly
decided.
But he can sue the owner for a recompense for his trouble and
disbursements in securing the lost articles. 1 But if the vessel or
floating structure belongs to the government a lien cannot be
implied against it; even where a municipality is the owner, it is
exempt, for a municipality is simplr a local branch of the sovereign
State.'2 While a maritime lien can attach only to a floating struc-
ture used in navigation, that is, in the carriage of persons and prop-
erty on navigable water; not every service to, contract concerning,
9 In his work on "Bailments," Judge Story has strongly contended
for a lien on property saved on land similar to a salvage lien. The lien must
be possessory and not maritime. But the weight of authority is decidedly to
the effect that no lien can be implied in favor of the finder. Story on Bail-
ments, Sec. 121 a; Binstead v. Buck, 2 Win. Bi. 1117; Nicholson v. Chapman,
2 H. BI. 254; Baker v. Hoag, 7 N. Y. 555-56o; Wentworth v. Day, 3 Met. 352.
10 Adm. Rule 20, Gastrel v. A Cypress Raft, 2 Woods, 213.
11 Doctor and Student Ch. 53; Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. Bl. 254; 2
Kent (6th Ed.) 355; Story on Bailments, See. 121 a; Jones on Liens, Sec. 485;
Reeder v. Anderson's Adm'rs, 4 Dana (Ky.) 193; Amory v. Flyn, zo John 102;
Preston v. Neale, 12 Gray 222; Chase v. Corcoran, io6 Mass. 286; Sheldon v.
Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484-487; Woods v. Pierson, 45 Mich. 313; De La 0. v.
Acoma, i New Mex. 226; Watts v. Ward, z Ore. 86.
12 The Fidelity, 16 Blatch. 596; Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U. S. 149.
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or wrong done by that structure gives a maritime lien against
it. The service or contract may be maritime and no lien follow.
This must be carefully understood at the outset; otherwise the
student of admiralty law will be misled by the loose expressions
of many able judges and become totally helpless in the well nigh
inextricable tangle -of conflicting authorities.
The lien can be expressed by the parties; can be implied by
admiralty law from the transactions or given by State statute.
Yet in each case the lien does not attach unless the contract is
maritime. Parties can create a lien when the contract is maritime;
general law implies one in certain forms of maritime contract and
State statutes which give liens can give them only when the con-
tract is maritime. A few examples will make this clear:
An owner mortgages his ship for his personal debt; there is no
maritime character'to the lien. Common law courts can therefore
alone give a remedy to the mortgagee against the mortgagor on
his contract.18 The owner or master pledges her keel by bot-
tomry bond to raise money for the ship's purposes; a lien is imme-
diately created; and the sole remedy on the lien is in admiralty.
14
The owner can, of course, pledge his boat on bottomry at any
time and place for his personal debt, but admiralty will not
enforce the lien for there is nothing maritime about the transac-
tion. An owner or master without funds in a foreign port pro-
cures supplies or causes his vessel to be repaired; a maritime lien
attaches to the ship and pending freight. The same thing is done
in an home port; no lien is implied; but the contract is maritime,
as the Supreme Court held in the famous General Smith, while if
the State gives a lien against a domestic ship for repairs or sup-
plies, etc., it can be enforced in admiralty under the I2th rule as
construed by the Court in the Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 551
If the State gives a lien against a vessel in favor of the builder
or the furnisher of materials to build her, it can not be enforced
in the Admiralty Court, for the contract is not maritime.
15 But a
State can enforce that lien for the same reason, and its tribunals
do not trespass upon the constitutional domain of the federal juris-
diction. It is the ordinarr foreclosure of a mechanic's lien.
What, therefore, is a maritime contract ? In Insurance
Company v. Dunham, ii Wall. 1, 31, the Supreme Court vainly
18 Bogart v. The John Jay, r7 How. 399.
14 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624-646.
15 The Pacific, 9 Fed. Rep. 120; The Kingston, 23 Fed. Rep. 200; The Guid-
ing Star, i8 Fed. Rep. 263-268; The Selt, 3 Biss. 344-
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endeavored to define it ; and finally stated as its conclusions "the
best criterion of the maritime character of a contract is the system of
law from which it arises and by which it is governed."
The old British law was that a maritime contract was one
made upon the sea and to be performed thereon ;-but this rule
was overthrown in Menetone v. Gibbons, 3 T. R. 269, where the
subject matter was made the test; -in that case it was held that
a controversy concerning a bottomry bond was within the admi-
rality jurisdiction.
The doctrine that the contract must be executed within the
ebb and flow of the tide has long since been abrogated, although
it caused much trouble in the earlier questions before the U. S.
Supreme Court; but in a very strong opinion has lately received
a re-exhumation and a last reburial.16
But the fact that there is a remedy at common law does not
prevent the character of the contract being maritime. Sailors are
the wards of admiralty, but they have common law rights against
the ship's owners. A policy of marine insurance is another
instance of concurrent jurisdiction.
The subject matter of the contract is therefore the test; if the
contract concerns navigation, and ships as floating structures, it
is maritime; otherwise the contract is one purely of common law
jurisdiction.
The contract to build a ship is not maritime. This was -early
decided. The ship is intended to sail, but until the vessel becomes
a floating thing capable of navigation it cannot be subject to
admiralty jurisdiction and therefore cannot carry a maritime lien.
The matter is analagous to a contract for a marine policy. The
The contract is maritime when the policy is made, not when an
agreement to make a policy is consummated. Likewise the cargo
is bound to the vessel after it is laden, but not before. A ship
broker who arranges a charter party has no standing in an attempt
to collect his commissions; but the charter when made is a mari-
time contract, and construed and enforced by the admiralty law.
The broker who engages a crew makes no implied maritime con-
tract with the owners for compensation for his services and has no
lien against the vessel. 17
Brown, D. J., in The Thames, io Fed. Rep. 848, has well said:
"The distinction between preliminary services leading to a maritime con-
tract and such contracts themselves have been affirmed in this country from
16 Exfiarte Garnett, 141 U. S. I.
17 Insurance Company v'. Dunbm, xi Wall.; The Thames, zo Fed. Rep.
848; The Crystal Stream, 25 Fed. ReP 575; Ferris v. Jewett, 2 Fed. Rep. ixn.
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the first and not yet departed from. It furnishes a distinction capable of some-
what easy application. Ifitbebroken down I donot perceive anyother dividing
line for excluding from admiralty many other sorts of claims which have a
reference more or less remote to navigation and commerce. If the broker of a
charter party be admitted, the insurance broker must follow, the drayman, the
expressman, and all others who perform services having reference to a voyage
either in contemplation or executed."
But it has been held that although the contract of shipbuilding
is not maritime, yet the contract to furnish supplies or material to
a ship not yet built, but being built in a foreign port, is maritime,
provided the materials, etc., are ordered in contemplation of a
-voyage.18 But the writer doubts whether the distinction- antici.-
pation of marine service-is a good one. A ship is built for
no other purpose than a voyage, and such intention must be
implied in every case. This decision is opposed to the better
doctrine that when supplies and materials are furnished for a
vessel not yet built, although in contemplation of the vessel's sail-
ing, the contract is not maritime and no lien results. The cases
are numerous and better considered.
There is no difference in the contract to build and the contract
to furnish materials for building.
19 The Manhattan, 46 F. 797,
attempts to recognize both lines of cases by holding that a
contract of building gives no lien but that a rebuilding before, the
ship is completed and ready for commerce is a maritime contract
and gives a lien.. When Judge Benedict says, in 33 Fed. :Rep.
299, "The Supreme Court has yet to hold that contracts to imake
-nets for a contemplated fishing voyage of a fishing vessel are not
maritime because made on land, and with reference to a voyage
to be performed," he is surely wrong, for in Edwards v. Elliot, 21
Wall. 532, 554, Clifford J. said, "Ships are bought and sold in the
-market just as ship timber, engines, anchors or chronometers are
bought and sold, and no reason is perceived why a oontract to
build a ship any more than a contract for the materials of which a
.ship is composed or for the instruments or appurtenances to propel or
manage the ship, should be regarded as maritime," and fish-nets
are surely appurtenances.
20
18 The Hiram R. Dixon, 33 Fed. Rep. 297.
19 In re Glenmont, 32 Fed. Rep. 703 ; Edwards v. Elliot, 21 Wall. 532;
Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393 ; Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129; The
Pacific, 9 Fed. 120 ; The Norway, 3 Ben. x63 ; The Count de Lesseps, 17 Fed.
Rep. 460, Contra: the Eliza Ladd, 3 Sawyer 5ig; The Revenue Cutter No. 
2,
4 Sawyer 143.
So The Witch Queen, 3 Sawyer 201.
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Under rule 12, promulgated in 1872, a State lien in favor of
the ship builder or to a contractor who furnishes materials cannot
be enforced by the Admiralty Courts by a proceeding in rem.-
for the contract is not maritime. This position has been well
defended in the Pacific, 9 Fed. Rep. I2o, by Judge Hughes, of the
district of Virginia.21 But the Calisto, Day. 30 ; Read v. Hull of
a new ship, i Story 244 ; Davis v. a new brig, Gilp. 473 ; Merritt
v. Sackett, 12 L. Rep. 515, are against the doctrine. But for the
most part these decisions were rendered before Roach v. Chapman.
As to whether a stevedore has a maritime lien for lading and
unlading a cargo, has been debated back and forth by the Circuit
Courts. The majority are in favor of the lien. It depends of
course upon the decision of the question whether the service is
maritime.
The following are in favor of the lien: The Williams, it
Brown Adm. 225 ; The George G. Kemp, 2 Low. 482 ; The Sen-
ator, 21 Fed. Rep. 191 ; Roberts v. The Bark Windemere, 2. Fed.
Rep. 722 ; The Canada, 7 Fed. Rep. ix9 ; The Circassian, i Ben.
209 ; The Hattie M. Bain, 20 Fed. Rep. 389 ; The Sarah E. Ken-
nedy, 29 Fed. Rep. 264; Florez v. The Scotia, 35 Fed. Rep. 916 ;
The Wyoming, 36 Fed. Rep. 495 ; The Olga, 32 Fed. Rep. 4.79 ;
The Henry Warner, 29 Fed. Rep. 6oi, 603 ; The Gilbert Knapp,
37 Fed. Rep. 209 ; The Velox, 21 Fed. Rep. 479.
Against the lien are: The Amstel, B1. and H. 215 ; The
Joseph Cunard, Olc. 123 ;. Cox v. Murray, Abb. Ad. 341; The S.
G. Owens, i Wall. Jr. 370; The A. R. Dunlap, i Low. 361; The
Bark Ilex, 2 Woods. 229; The Esteban de Antunano, 31 Fed.
Rep. 920.
The Augustine Kobbe, 37 Fed. Rep. 696, while deciding that the
claim of the stevedore is not maritime, held that it might be enforced
in admirality as a State lien; while in the Wyoming (supra) it was
held that it was maritime, and a lien results against the vessel
even in a home port, when the fact appears even expressly or
inferentially that the services are rendered on the credit of the
vessel.
If stevedores have a lien, it must be by virtue of a maritime
contract. They stand in the same position then as material men,
and to obtain a lien in a home port, apart from a State statute, the
21 Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129; The Witch Queen, 3 Sawyer 201,.
206; The J. C. Rich, 46 F. 136; The Dundee, i Hagg. Adm. Iog; The
Kingston, 23 F. 2oo ; Scull v. Shakespeare, 75 Pedn. St. 29, ; Young v. The,
Orpheus, 2 Cliff. 29.
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hypothecatiom in their favor must be express. But the finding
in the "Kobbe" (sura) is an example of the misunderstanding
prevalent even among learned lawyers concerning the distinction
between maritime contracts and maritime liens. Admirality has
jurisdiction of stevedores' claims, or it has not. If it has, it must
be only when the vessel is in a foreign port, unless a special con-
tract is made. tf the vessel is domestic, the next question is
whether the statute of the State gives a lien and whether it has
been complied with.
MARITIME TORTS. LOCALITY OF ACT THE TEST OF ADMIRALITY
JURISDICTION.
However much admirality jurisdiction in matters of contract
has been controverted, in matters of tort the courts have laid down
a plain rule and easily applied. It is as follows :
"There can be no jurisdiction in the admirality unless the substantial-
cause of action arising out of the wrong is complete upon navigable waters."
It was applied in the case of a fire communicating from a vessel
in navigable waters to a wharf and ware-house thereon; 2 to a
collision with a dock;23 with a swing bridge; 2 to a collision
between a ship and a derrick, which with its tackle was being
used in the building of a pier for a light house in Long Island
Sound; ?5 to damage a marine railway from a ship's dragging her
anchor across its ground ways; 2 to the case of a steamboat neg-
ligently running against an oil depot on the levee of the Missis-
sippi river when by reason of flood -it was surrounded by naviga-
ble water.r A case, The Mary Stewart, io Fed. Red. 137, is put
upon this ground by Hughes J. where a stevedore not in the
direct employ of the ship, but working under the employ
of a contractor was injured by the fall of a bale of cotton
on him while he was upon the wharf. The rope used in the
lading of the cotton belonged to the ship, and broke under the
weight of the cotton, whence the damage to the libelant.
22 The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 2o, fn re Insurance Co., xiS U. S. 6xo.
23 The Ottawa, x Brown 356; C. Accame, 2o Fed. Rep. 642.
24 Nell Cochran, x Brown, 162; City of Milwaukee v. The Curtis, 37 Fed.
Rep- 705 ; City of Boston v. Crowley, 38 Fed. Rep. 202.
25 Maude Webster, 8 Ben. 547.
28 The Professor Morse, 23 Fed. Rep. 803.
27 The Arkansas, x7 Fed. Rep. 383.
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Extreme cases have been put upon this ground, a tort to a
boom which floated but with one end attached to the shore.s
The decision of the Mary Stewart (supra) is right on the principle
of the locality of the tort, not on the principle of master and ser-
vant. If the stevedore was rightfully on the wharf, in the service
of the ship, the ship was under a duty not to injure him. This
duty was matter inducement in pleading the tort. The stevedore
had a remedy at common law which a stranger or trespasser would.
not have.
Can this principle of locality of the tort be carried so far as to
apply to the injury of a sailor on the wharf by reason of its negli-
gence while he is engaged in the service of the ship? It seems
unreasonable to permit a sailor to sue in admiralty when he is
standing on the deck or working in the hold when injured, the
admiralty giving him a lien upon the ship, and to refuse him that
privilege when he happens to be upon the wharf in the ship's ser-
vice.
An instance of the narrow line separating the two jurisdictions
appears in New York v. Hichland, 6 Ben. 289, when an exception
to the libel for not stating a cause of admiralty jurisdiction was
overruled, as it did not appear that the pier injured was on the
land. It might have been a floating structure.
It must be constantly remembered, however, that though a
tort be maritime no lien follows where there is nothing to which
the lien can attach, viz: a floating structure engaged in naviga-
tion.29
I have stated some elementary principles of a maritime lien.
To discuss the various maritime contracts which give a lien would
take a volume. It is but fair to say, however elementary the
foregoing observations may be, that admiralty books give but a
hazy conception of the distinctions which I have attempted to
thus briefly set forth.
28 City of Erie v. Canfield, 27 Mich. 479. Contra: The Ceres, E. D. Pa. 7-
Weekly Note Cases 576.
29 Atlee v. Packett Co., 21 Wall 389; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213;
R. R. Co. v. Tug Boat Co., 23 How. 209; Etheridge v. Philadelphia, 26 Fed.
Rep. 43; The City of Lincoln, 25 Fed. Rep. 835; Leonard v. Decker, 22 Fed-
Rep. 741; Gerrity v,. The Kate Cann, 2 Fed. Rep. 241; Todd v. Tulchen, id. 6oo.
